讲座题目：Know Enough or Don’t Know at All: Rank Information Provision at Workplace

摘要：Rank-order tournaments are effective incentives for performance in workplaces and organizations. Big data technologies make peer comparisons more accessible with a simple click on electronic devices. We study the value and the effect of rank information on productivity in a competitive environment using a laboratory experiment. With a between-subject design, we compare 1) two types of relative status information own position and all ranks with performance distributions along with a baseline just with absolute performance feedback, and 2) their willingness to pay for rank information in cases of paying for own rank, and others’ ranks with performance distribution. Our results show that compared to PaidComplete, participants in PaidRelative are willing to pay more to obtain information about own rank, and this willingness does not diminish quickly over time. However, when they are given the opportunity to purchase rank information, they exert less effort when receiving others’ rank information and the least effort when receiving own rank, compared to the no rank information setting. The same pattern occurs when participants receive complimentary information. Organizations should carefully consider the design and delivery of rank based performance feedback to optimize effort and performance.

主讲人：郑金笛（华中科技大学助理教授）

讲座时间：2026年5月21日13:00—14:30

讲座地点：求是楼347会议室

线上：请通过以下链接报名后获取腾讯会议号：//v.wjx.cn/vm/wFl6rLJ.aspx#

讲座语言：中英文

主持人：陈泽阳 讲师

参与人员：热烈欢迎广大师生参加。

主讲人简介：

郑金笛，华中科技大学经济学院助理教授，阿姆斯特丹大学经济学博士。主要从事行为与实验经济学、数字经济、文化经济学与算法政策等方面研究。近五年，以第一作者或通讯作者在 Experimental Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organizations、International Review of Financial Analysis等国际一流期刊发表论文。主持国家自然科学基金青年项目。担任 Experimental Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organizations、Nature Communications等国际知名期刊匿名审稿人。